

# Migration Trends and Challenges in China

Xiulian MA

## 1. Migration Trends in China

### 1.1. Chinese Style Internal Migrant: Floating Population under *Hukou* System

#### 1.1.1. Defining Internal Migration in China

Ever since 1978, profound changes have been found in all walks of life in China, including economy and society, and the phenomenon of “internal migration”, i.e., mass population movement, is one of such changes. In order to study the internal migration in China, we should at first have clear definitions on concepts such as “internal migration”, “floating population”, and “migrant worker”, etc.

Migrant is defined as the one who moves from a place to another and acquires the permanent residency rights of the destination. Migration can be classified into international migration and internal migration, where International Migration refers to those who move from country to country and change their permanent residencies, and Internal Migration refers to those who move from a place to another within a country and change their permanent residencies. A typical example of Internal Migration is the migration in China. With the accelerated urbanization in China over the past 4 decades, many migrants strived and overcame various troubles to migrate from poor areas to affluent areas, to pursue better living and working conditions. Floating population refers to those who “temporarily” move to a destination with no local residency rights and are only temporarily living and working in the destination. In China, the floating population is mainly comprised of rural-to-urban migrants. However, due to the special household registration system and the fast urbanization drive in China, it has become a trend for floating population to move from poor areas to affluent areas and urban areas. In China, the household registration system is bound with the educational, healthcare and social welfare benefits of a person, thus the floating population is not eligible for the same array of social benefits and rights local residents enjoy. Floating population in China is group of underprivileged group.

Migrant worker refers to peasant from rural and poor areas who seek works in cities in an endeavor to change the destiny of their family. The definition of Migrant Worker came into being in 1978 with peasants moving to seek jobs in cities. Migrant worker is neither peasant nor worker, and have to work harder with low payment and without local benefits and rights. This group of population is huge and accounts for a major part of China’s floating population.

In general, “internal migrants in China” in this paper refers mainly to the floating population who move from poor areas to cities for living and working, and who are ineligible for local residency rights and the same benefits and rights that the local resident qualify for, and who live in underprivileged conditions.

### 1.1.2 The Emergence of Floating Population under the Household Registration System

China's floating population is a result of the household registration system. The household registration system, narrowly defined, means the *Hukou* registration system with the *Household Registration Regulations of the People's Republic of China* enacted in 1958 as its core. It legally stipulated two basic principles on population migration control, i.e., principle of prior approval before migration and principle of *Hukou*-granting with certificate, the purpose of which is to suppress the unlimited increase of urban laborers, and restrict irrational outflow of rural laborers. In a broader sense, the household registration system includes other regulations and entitlements, such as grain and oil supply, employment, healthcare, education, demobilization and settlement of army forces, marriage, and *Hukou* status granting to immediate families, etc. (Lu 2002).

This *Hukou* system which was stipulated under specific historical conditions has hampered the free flows of population. Since the Reform and Opening-up of China in 1978, a series of reforms on the household registration system have been introduced, to adapt to the new development situation in China. *The Notice of the State Council on the Issue of Granting Hukou Status to Peasants Living in Townships and Cities* issued in October 1984 regulated that peasants who handle their own grain rations are allowed to work, conduct business and provide tertiary services in cities and townships, which gave rise to the Temporary Residence Permit system in China. It was an adaptive reform to facilitate the large number of rural surplus laborers to work in cities, yet further encouraged rural-to-urban migration. At the same time, it didn't touch on the household registration reform. The urban household registration system didn't accommodate these temporary migrants, and instead, it helped laying a barrier between the local residents with *Hukou* and those without in the cities. The household registration system and relevant systems established on top of it made it hard for floating population to get equal access to the economic and social benefits gained from urban development.

*The Framework Opinions on Major Issues of Comprehensively Deepening Public Security Reform* issued on 15<sup>th</sup> February 2015 and relevant reform schemes explicitly stipulated on the cancellation of Temporary Residence Permit system. They marked the end of the system which had been implemented for 30 years in China. It was replaced with the Residence Permit System implemented in 2016, under which, population who has no local residency rights but lives and works in the cities on a permanent basis shall apply for the Residence Permit to enjoy equal local benefits and rights. As stipulated, person holding the residence permit has access to the right to employment, participation in social insurance system, and depositing, withdrawal and utilizing of house provident fund, to the 6 basic public services including compulsory education, basic public employment, and basic public healthcare, and to the 7 procedure simplifications including simplifications on passport applications and ID card issuance and renewals. Notwithstanding, the thresholds for the application of residence permits and the benefits granted vary from localities to localities, and the gap between floating population and local residents still lingers.


## 1.2. Floating Population: Scale and Structural Features

### 1.2.1. Scale and Trend of Growth

The statistics of floating population comes mainly from the censuses and surveys conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics. Some data also come from the annually conducted floating population dynamic monitoring survey by the National Health and Family Planning Commission and China Migrant Development Report based on this.

China has conducted four censuses since 1982, i.e., 1982, 1990, 2000 and 2010, and four sampling surveys on 1% population in 1987, 1995, 2005 and 2015. They have laid a solid foundation for numbers, scale and trend of floating population in China.

From late 1950s to early 1980s, there was not so much floating population in China, and the number of floating population, according to the census estimation in 1982, was only 6.57million, accounting for only 0.66% of the total population. However, with the Reform and Opening-up and the economic transformation, in particular with the *Notice of the State Council on the Issue of Granting Hukou Status to Peasants Living in Townships and Cities* issued in 1984, the government began to loosen its control over the migration of rural population into middle and small townships, thus accelerated population flows. Floating population in China plunged to 18.1 million in 1987, which kept on increasing and many flushed into large and medium-sized cities (Duan et al, 2008; Zou 2011). By 2015, the total floating population in China has reached 245.97 million, taking up 17.9% of the total population. In China, every one in 5.5 persons is floating without local residency right (see Figure 1).



\*Fig. 1 Curve of Floating Population in China after Reform and Opening-up

Prepared by Xiulian Ma based on Statistics from National Statistics Bureau

*China Migrant Development Report 2016* issued by National Health and Family Planning Commission forecasted that by 2020, the floating population in China will increase by 6-7 million on a yearly basis, and after 2020, with urbanization deepening, this yearly increase will be lowered to less than 5 million. Based on various forecasting data, the total floating population in China will lower to 150-160 million by 2030.

### 1.2.2. Composition and Flow

The composition and flow of the large number of floating population in China needs further analysis and description.

**a) Composition of floating population. When migrants with rural *Hukou* are the main source of China's floating population, urban-to-urban migration has gradually become an important trend.**

First, migrants with rural *Hukou* are the main source of China's floating population. According to 2010 census statistics, the proportion of migrants with rural *Hukou* is 76% of the total (see Table 1). This number is close to the forecast of National Health and Family Planning Commission, which forecasted that by 2015, China's floating population will gradually increase to 250 million, and migrants with rural *Hukou* will increase to 190 million, accounting for 76% of the total (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2012:3-5).

Table 1 Proportion and Estimated Quantity of Floating Population of Four Categories from Two Different Sources in 2010

Category	1# source		2# source		Difference
	Samples	Percentage	Samples	Percentage	
Rural-to-urban migrants	116548	63.30	115501	62.73	0.57
Urban-to-urban migrants	38956	21.16	40003	21.73	-0.57
Rural-to-rural migrants	23375	12.69	23681	12.86	-0.17
Urban-to-rural migrants	5251	2.85	4945	2.69	0.16

Note: calculated based on the original data of the 6<sup>th</sup> census on 1‰ population (Ma et al, 2014)

In particular, those rural-to-urban migrants, accounting for 63.3% of total floating population, are the backbone for China's urbanization drive and contribute to the increase of urban population from 170 million to 770 million, and urbanization rate from 17.8% to 56.1%. However, since a large number of floating population cannot acquire urban residency rights, the *Hukou* urbanization rate is only 39.9% (Fig. 2), 16.2 percentage points lower than the actual urbanization rate, which means a gap to the total urbanization rate of nearly 30%, i.e., 222 million people. Obviously, the rural-to-urban migrants are main reason causing this gap.




Fig.2 China's Urbanization Rate (1990-2015)

Second, rural-to-rural migration is becoming an important trend. Based on 2010 census data, rural-to-rural migration accounted for about 21.16% of the total floating population, while it was 20.8% in 2000 with little fluctuations compared with 2010 (Ma et al, 2014:37). However, with social and economic development in China, although the numbers of laborers migrating to cities and townships are stabilizing, urban laborers, in particular young and middle aged, in some underdeveloped areas are rushing to cities and towns for more employment opportunities and higher incomes, and this trend is becoming stronger, contributing to a growing trend of urban-to-urban migration.

**b) Flow of floating population. Floating population has contributed largely to China's urbanization drive, and it has become a main trend for floating population to migrate to the eastern provinces and large cities.**

**First, going to the Eastern Region.** *China Migrant Development Report 2016* stated that in 2015, floating population in the eastern region of China takes up as high as 74.7% of the total all around China. Coastal regions, such as Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta distinguish themselves in attracting floating population. From 1982 to 2005, the percentage of floating population in Guangdong Province has increased from 5.23% to 22.37% of the total population in China, and that summed-up percentage of floating population in total population of China in Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang Provinces in the Yangtze River Delta increased from 11.27% to 20.58%. As shown in the 1% sampling survey in 2005, the floating population in Shanghai, Guangdong, Beijing, Zhejiang and Fujian accounts for 34%, 26%, 23%, 20% and 19% respectively of the total local residents, which means that one in every five or even three people is migrant (Duan et al. 2008:32). As shown in Fig. 3 which is prepared on the basis of 2010 census data, among all provinces with most inflow of population, Guangdong takes the lead and is in the first category (more than 20 million), Zhejiang is in the second category (10-20 million), Beijing, Jiangsu and Shanghai are in the third category (6-10 million), and Fujian is in the fourth category (4-6 million). Among all the provinces with the most outflows of population, Henan, Anhui, Hunan and Sichuan are in the first category (6-10 million),

Guizhou, Guangxi, Hubei and Jiangxi are in the second category (4-6 million) (He, 2015). The trend of going from the Middle and Western regions to the Eastern is quite obvious.

**Second, Going to large cities.** In the next decade, the three metropolises, 19 urban agglomerations and urbanized regions will become major destinations for newly added urban population, which is estimated to be about 1/2 of total newly added population in cities. This trend was evident in the 2010 census data. Of 221.43 million floating population, 107.43 million are in the three metropolitan areas, accounting for 48.6% of the total, including 34.32 million (15.5%) in Pearl River Delta, 43.9 million (19.9%) in Yangtze River Delta, and 29.21 million (13.2%) in Circum-Bohai Sea region (He, 2015). The net population inflow ratio to super large cities including Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin increased from 17.5%, 18.2% and 6.6% in 2000 to 34.5%, 37.9% and 21.0% in 2010, with obvious Matthew Effect (Citic China Securities, 2016).




Fig. 3 Population Inflows & outflows among Provinces in China (2010)

Source: He (2015).

### 1.2.3. Other Structural Features

**a) Transformation from social migration to economic migration.** Population migration in China has obviously shifted from social migration (i.e., marriage and family reunion, which accounted for 56.3% in 1987; and migration through marriage took up as high as 21.04%) to economic migration (working, doing business, and work shift, etc. which accounted for 60.2% in 1990). And the percentage of laborers and businessmen in floating population has maintain at around 50-55% ever since.

**b) More laborers in floating population, with older age.** The percentage of laborers in floating population was only 57.91% in 1982, which was increased to 80.4% in 1990, and kept on increasing afterwards. This is conforming to the characteristics of

economic migration. At the same time, the median age of floating population was also on the rise, from 23-year-old in 1982 to 29-year-old in 2005.

**c) Transformation to gender equality.** In 1982, the ratio between male and female in floating population was 84:100, with more female migrants, which showed a feature of social migration. The situation changed later and peaked in 1990 with the ratio between male and female of 125:100, which indicates that young and strong males joined in the economic migration wave. The ratio between males and females in floating population was 101:100 in 2005, an equal number of males and females indicates that women has joined in to be migrant laborers in a household migration manner.

**d) Transformation to household migration.** The 1990 census showed that only 7.4% of the floating population lived in a household comprised of only migrants, meaning that the scale of household migration is quite limited. Yet in 2000, the percentage has increased to 46.1%, almost 5 times higher, and this trend has been strengthened ever since, indicating that household migration has become one of the first choices for floating populations (Zhou 2004).

### **1.3 Challenges of new generation migrant worker**

#### **1.3.1 New-generation Migrant Worker**

When migrant worker is the largest and weakest group among all floating population, special attentions shall be paid to the new-generation migrant workers due to their characteristics and new demands.

Migrant workers are those who migrate from rural areas to urban areas to seek for work. The gap between the actual urbanization rate of 56.1% and the *Hukou* urbanization rate of 39.9% in 2015 and the 222 million people affected shall by a large part be considered as migrant workers. As estimated based on Dynamic Monitoring and Survey on the Citizenship of Migrant Workers by National Bureau of Statistics, in 2015, the total number of migrant workers and their families is 176.508 million.

Since the Reform and Opening-up, though the numbers of migrant workers in China is increasing, gaps began to surface among them. A new phenomenon of “New-generation Migrant Worker” (or “New-generation Floating Population”) appears, showcasing the gap among migrate workers and their changed demands.

“New-generation Migrant Worker” was a concept come up with by Chunguang Wang (2001) and was used to describe the generational changes in rural floating population and to distinguish them from traditional migrant workers. If we call the rural floating population who migrate to cities in the 1980s as the First Generation, then those who migrate in the 1990s can be called as the new generation. The differences between the new-generation and the first generation, except for age, marriage status and educational background, lie in their experiences in rural sectors and their migration motivations. Among the first-generation migrant workers, 54.5% have experiences in agricultural sectors, versus only 39.2% of the new-generation migrant workers. Many of the new-generation migrant workers pursue works in cities right after graduation, and with little agricultural knowledge, they are also known as

“peasants with no agricultural experiences”. In terms of migration motivation, they are also different from the economic migration of the previous generation. The new-generation migration is both economically and socially motivated, with a purpose of changing their living conditions and pursuing urban or modernized life style.

Later on, the new-generation migrants refer mainly to the new-generation born after 1980s. According to the Dynamic Monitoring and Survey on Floating Population in 2010, the new-generation migrants took up 47% of the total population. As shown in *China Migrant Development Report 2016*, among the migrants in corresponding working ages in 2015, the new-generation took up over half of the total, which is 51.1%. All these data prove that the new-generation migrants have become the main part of migrant workers.

### **1.3.2 Features of new-generation migrant workers**

As shown in National Dynamic Monitoring and Survey on Floating Population in 2010, new-generation migrant workers have the following features:

**Higher education background:** the average years of education received by new-generation migrant workers in 2010 is 9.8 years, with little illiterates, and over 5% are university graduates. While the average years of education received by previous generations, i.e. age between 31-45 years old and over 46 years old, are 8.4 years and 7.6 years respectively.

**Pressure of marriage and raising children:** compared with the migrants aged between 31-45 years old whose major pressure is raising children, and those aged over 46 years old whose major pressure is tending to the elderly, the pressures faced by the new-generation is dual, i.e., marriage and raising kids. Over 55% of the new-generation migrants are married, and among them, over 80% have to raise one or more kids.

**Mainly industrial workers:** migrant workers are retrieving from the wholesaling & retailing, construction, agriculture & farming industries, and are moving to manufacturing sector instead. About 46.3% of new-generation migrants are industrial workers, which is over ten percentage points higher than the previous generation.

### **1.3.2 Social demands**

The previous generation migrants lead a pendulum or migratory bird living style, which means that they are only temporarily living in the city and will finally go back to the rural areas. In contrast, the new-generation migrant workers are “permanently” living in the urban areas.

On the one hand, migrant workers are treated as pure labor providers and to a great extent, are rejected by urban areas. They are confined to secondary labor market, and many of them are informally employed. With limited formal participation in urban labor division and without effective connections to the social, institutional and cultural systems in cities, they are not truly integrated into urban life in the city.

On the other hand, new-generation migrants are unwilling to accept this situation, and only treat it as a temporary and transitional period. Though for the time being

they are not regarded as urban citizens, they hope to make it happen in the future. Therefore, their social demands are changing accordingly:

**a) They are willing to settle in cities:** as shown in *China Migrant Development Report 2011*, only about one quarter of new-generation migrants are willing to come back home, but most of them are on the condition of working at least in townships. Only 13.2% are willing to go back to rural areas, accounting for only 3.3% of the total new-generation migrants. This is mainly because of their little agricultural experiences and the changed identity. According to the Questionnaire on Migrant Worker by the Development Research Center of the State Council in 2005, the average working years of the first generation migrants on agriculture is 11.4 years, while that of the second generation is 2.1 years, and 37.9% of them have no agricultural experiences. In terms of identity, the first generation migrant workers never “treat themselves as part of cities” and regard themselves “still as peasants”; while the second-generation migrants tend to “think they are part of cities”, and “shall have the same social identity as the urban residents”. Little agricultural experiences and the “self-identity as urban-residents” make it hard for them to return to rural areas but have to settle down in cities.

**b) They are unsatisfied with their lives:** based on the study of Xia Luo and Chunguang Wang (2003), the new-generation has lower satisfaction on their lives than the first generation, where 12% of new-generation versus 28% of the first generation is satisfied with their lives. The first generation migrants are mainly pushed by the bad economic status in villages, thus compared themselves with the rural life and their counterparts in villages. Without very high expectation on the outside world, they are easily satisfied with their lives. On the contrary, new-generation migrants are pulled by the excitement of the city life and have higher expectations. They always compare themselves to urban residents, thus are unsatisfied with their status.

**c) They expect to have same opportunities and benefits as urban residents.** The social demands of the new-generation migrants shift from the expectation of more social security and benefits to more mobility opportunities, more access to cultural life and even expansion of citizenship. However, their demands are always confined by reality. For example, new-generation migrants have more developmental consumptions (including telecommunications, daily necessities, etc.) than the previous generation. Their consumption in recreational activities is two times higher than the previous generation though they mainly participate in low-level recreational activities, with only 116.5RMB. The reasons for these include: low income level, immature recreational consumption concept, low identification with their destinations, and little access to local recreational resource, etc.

## **2. Major Challenges: Insufficient Equalization of Public Services and Integration Dilemma**

### **2.1. Discrimination under *Hukou* system**

Though China has been executing reforms on its *Hukou* system and trying to treat

floating population as local residents, there are still huge differences between local residents and floating population in the access to benefits and welfares including employment, education, social securities, etc.

Li & Ren (2011) has done comparisons between local Shanghai residents and the floating population in seven aspects, i.e. employment, education, endowment insurance, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, subsistence security, and housing security.

In terms of education opportunities, local residents have no restrictions to be employed or choose occupation, and are endowed with good labor protections; while floating population are denied entry to a lot of industries and occupations. For example, floating population cannot apply for posts in government sector and institutional organizations, and are mainly employed in informal organizations or in informal positions in formal organizations. The floating population has to work longer hours with less hourly remunerations than the locals.

In terms of education opportunities, local residents enjoy 9-year free compulsory education with no restrictions for senior high school entrance exams and university entrance exams (actually enjoying more quotas than the floating population). On the contrary, the floating population is faced with many restrictions: they can only enter into public schools when there are vacancies; they have to pay extra charges of 500-800 RMB per semester; they cannot participate in the college/university entrance exams in the destination city, etc.

In terms of medical insurance, locals enjoy urban employee's basic medical insurance (UEBMI), while floating population can only enjoy a so-called "Comprehensive Insurance for Migrants in Shanghai Municipality", which has lower payment ratio than UEBMI.

In terms of unemployment insurance, locals can enjoy Shanghai's unemployment benefits and can get jobs recommended by government or participate in training organized by government which is denied for floating population.

In terms of subsistence allowance, locals enjoy subsistence allowance the city provides, while the floating population doesn't.

In terms of affordable housing, locals are entitled to apply for low-rent housing and economically affordable housing, while the floating population is denied of.

*Hukou* system has caused many problems in China, such as hampering the free flow of its citizens, gap deepening between floating population and local residents, and hindering the urbanization drive. *Hukou* discrimination also give rise to urban privileged population, therefore, the abolishment of *Hukou* system is needed for the social development of China.

## **2.2. Insufficient equalization of basic public services**

In a broader perspective, the *hukou* discrimination is reflected in the insufficient equalization of basic public services. Equalization of basic public services means that in basic public services areas, the government and public finance provide equal public products and services to different social groups and give them equal access. In

particular, it means to provide equal basic public services to the urban *Hukou* residents and the floating population, and to gradually eliminate the polarity in terms of access to employment, social security, education, housing, health care, political right, and cultural activities, etc. and promote social integration.

However, according to National Dynamic Monitoring and Survey on Floating Population in 2010, the supply of basic public services to the floating population is far from sufficient:

First, opportunities to compulsory education: 73.4% of migrants' children are studying in public schools and the rest 26.6% are studying in schools for migrants' children or private schools. As shown in the Dynamic Monitoring and Survey on the Citizenship of Migrant Workers by National Bureau of Statistics in 2015, about 55.6% of migrant parents complain on the difficulties to get their children enrolled in urban schools, and the percentage goes to 62.6% and 78.4% in mega cities (5-10 million de facto residents and super large cities (over 10 million de facto residents) and) respectively. Their complaints are mainly focused on difficult in school enrolment (31.4%) and high charges (62.6%).

Second, opportunities to employment trainings: Only 12.5% of the employed floating population and 3.8% of unemployed floating population have received employment trainings organized by the government.

Third, poor housing & sanitary conditions and high burden in renting houses: the floating population only enjoy 13.1 square meters per capita, and over half of the migrant families enjoy less than 10 square meters per capita. On the contrary, based on the 2010 census, the average urban resident per-capita housing is 31.93 square meters, which is three times that of the former (Liu et al, 2010). The census also shows that there is no toilet or only shared toilet for 20.9% and 20.8% of the floating population families respectively. And 41.5% of the floating population thinks that the housing expenditure has reached or surpassed their limit.

fourth, access to social securities: The percentage of floating population participating in injury insurance, medical insurance, pension and retirement insurance, unemployment insurance, maternity insurance and housing provident fund is only 31.7%, 55.7%, 23.8%, 12.1%, 8.0% and 4.6% respectively.

Fifth, other insufficiencies: Hospital delivery rate is low, with 16.7% of women in the western areas deliver at home or private clinics. Disparities in terms of income distribution among the floating population are significant, where the percentage of poor households and the level of poverty are higher than that of urban residents.

## **2.3. Social integration dilemma**

### **2.3.1. New dualistic structure and semi-urbanization**

The long-term *Hukou* discrimination has not only resulted in insufficient equalization of basic public services for the floating population, but also led to social integration dilemma. Due to the dual urban-rural systems, and the backward *Hukou* and related systems, the issue of social integration of the floating population is becoming more acute.

Many new concepts such as new dualistic structure and semi-urbanization are used to describe the integration dilemma faced by the floating population. The new dualistic structure corresponds to the dualistic structure. In the era with planned economic system, the rural-urban dualistic structure is formed with different administrations between rural and urban areas. This rural-urban dualistic structure centered around *Hukou* solidified rather than disappeared since the reform and opening up. Meanwhile, while the floating population gradually integrated in and contributed to the social and economic development of the destination cities, the existing discrepancies between the floating population and the local residents in terms of accessing to various public services have not been completely eliminated. The old problems under the traditional dualistic structure such as the lack of public services, the inadequate articulation of reasonable requests, and inequality of economic and political treatments have developed into a “new dualistic structure”, i.e., acute discrepancies in terms of political right, incomes, public services, social identity and cultural customs, etc. It is an extension and demonstration of the traditional dualistic structure under the unbalanced regional development background.

Wang Chunguang (2006) has further come up with the concept of “semi-urbanization”. In his point of view, urbanization has three meanings: 1) systematical integration, i.e. interconnection of the economic system, social system, cultural system and institutional system, without any loosening part; 2) social integration, i.e., rural migrants have no obvious differences from the urban residents in terms of behavior and living style; 3) psychological acceptance of urban life, with strong belongs to the destination. From this point of view, the rural migrants are not completely integrated. Though rural migrants migrate to cities and find jobs there, they are only accepted in economic system, and are rejected by the social, cultural and institutional systems. Their life and actions are not effectively supported in cities, and are psychologically remote from the urban life, even lack the acceptance of urban life. Therefore, they live as semi-urbanized residents.

### **2.3.2 The hypothesis and measurement of social integration**

How will the floating population integrate with the local residents? Scholars have proposed several hypotheses on the social integration of floating population based on the actual conditions of China:

**a) Re-socialization theory.** According to Tian Kai, the process for the floating population to adapt to the urban life is a re-socialization process and needs three prerequisites: stable job, decent income, and decent social status. These three prerequisites make it possible for the floating population to contact with local residents, participate in local social life and accept similar values that locals have in the destination.

**b) New dualistic theory.** According to Ma Xiheng, the “dualistic relationship” between the migrants and the local community in cities which is featured with mutual isolation, exclusion, and unity of opposites will finally change to a “new dualistic relationship” which is featured with rationality, compatibility and cooperation. During this process, there will be another three stages, i.e., “dualistic

community”, “concord with others”, and “homogeneous identity”. The stage of “concord with others” is between isolation and self-identity, and is a critical stage for the social integration of the floating population to cities.

**c) Integration evolution theory.** The social integration for the floating population in the destination includes several layers and each layer is progressive with each other. Economic integration is the foundation for the migrants to settle in cities, social integration is the further requirements for the migrants to expand the width of their integration in urban life, while psychological integration is more spiritual and reflects the depth for their integration in urban life. Only with psychological and cultural integration can the floating population fully integrate into urban life in the destination.

Since social integration comprises of several dimensions, scholars have developed the social integration index system of floating population to measure the social integration of the floating population (ex. Liu & Cheng 2008; Wang & Wu 2011). It includes five aspects, i.e., public services, social securities, economic positions, community participation and identity. Based on the survey and analysis of *China Migrant Development Report 2011*, the social integration of rural migrants is lower; the social integration of local residents is 68/100, while the absolute index for rural-urban floating population is 31/100. Among different integration indexes of floating population, the best is economic identity which has 50 points, and the worst is social securities. According to relevant data, the major obstacle for the social integration of floating population is the gap caused by the *Hukou* system, so there is still a long way to go to realize the social integration of the floating population in China.

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